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agree with Professor Treves when he questions the feasibility and opportunity of introducing a
distinction between serious and non-serious violations of jus cogens rules: indeed, it appears that
seriousness characterizes by deﬁnition any violation of such fundamental and intransgressible
norms.
The last chapter is dedicated to the implementation of international law in the Italian legal order
and is without any doubt one of the highlights of the book. Some sections have been completely
re-written to take into account Constitutional Law no 3 of 18 October 2001, which amended
Article 117 of the Italian Constitution. There is controversy over whether the new version of this
provision really confers constitutional rank in the hierarchy of Italian legal sources to treaties
ratiﬁed by Italy. Professor Treves agrees with those who argue that no signiﬁcant changes to the
system of sources have been introduced by Law no 3/2001 and that constitutional challenges to
national laws based on Article 117 (1) of the Constitution should be exceptional (pp 694–95).
Professor Treves’s experience as a judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
since 1996 emerges throughout the work, where frequent references to the case law of the
Tribunal and a detailed section devoted to its composition and functioning stimulate the student to
get acquainted with the law of the sea. Furthermore, the author’s many references to primary
sources, often extensively quoted, make the textbook’s approach refreshingly pragmatic. The
indexes are detailed and useful, and so is the initial bibliographical note. The extensive footnote
apparatus containing references to relevant literature and the ﬁnal table of cases are also praise-
worthy. However, a table of treaties and of national legislation probably would have been helpful
for the reader.
To conclude, Professor Treves’s treatise is a very learned but also very easily readable book
that Italian-speaking students, academics and practitioners will not fail to appreciate. It is this
reviewer’s hope that an edition in English will make it accessible to a broader readership.
MARCO ROSCINI*
Comunita` internazionale e obblighi «erga omnes» by PAOLO PICONE [Jovene, Napoli, 2006,
684 pp, ISBN 8824316018, E35 (p/bk)]
This book is a collection of essays written by Professor Picone since the early 1980s on the
controversial issue of erga omnes obligations. The author’s aim is to demonstrate that inter-
national law can be construed in a realistic way, which takes into account the role played by the
great powers on the international scene. In his view, what we call the ‘international community’ is
a social entity superior to individual States and the ‘guardian’ of the general interests of the
prevailing socio-economic forces (p 143). Hence, if the international legal order is characterized
by the formal (legal) equality of States, the international community, on the contrary, rests
necessarily on disequality (pp 145–46).1 Starting from this premise, the author points out that
international law was initially aimed at merely regulating the coexistence of States, but has
subsequently developed rules on the cooperation and eventually the interdependence among the
different forces. This has led to the decline of the ‘contractual’ concept of international law in
favour of a ‘verticalisation’ of the normative processes, most evidently shown by the appearance
of the concept of erga omnes obligations. Such obligations, that impose a conduct enforceable by
all States acting uti universi, imply that there are interests of the international community as a
whole distinct from those of individual States. Professor Picone persuasively holds that erga
omnes obligations and jus cogens provisions are not necessarily the same thing. Indeed, although
* Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Westminster; Visiting Lecturer, King’s College
London and Queen Mary University of London.
1 The author further distinguishes the international community as ‘source’ of law (deﬁned only by the




many jus cogens provisions do impose erga omnes obligations, there might also exist peremptory
norms that are bilateral in character (pp 30–33). The author thus argues that international crimes
consist of certain (serious) violations of erga omnes obligations, and not of jus cogens rules
(pp 41–42).
In his ﬂamboyant style, the author applies these general views to speciﬁc ﬁelds of international
law, such as international environmental law (in particular the pollution of the marine environ-
ment) and international economic law. Most of the essays are, however, devoted to the United
Nations and the use of force. In the author’s view, in certain cases the link between the inter-
national community (as deﬁned above) and an international organization is so strong that the latter
can operate not only as an instrument of its Member States but also as a ‘material’ organ of the
former. This happens when the organization is structured so that the forces prevailing in the
international community can actually control the organization, and when the organization has
been created for the protection of the general interests of the international community as a whole
(pp 176–78). According to Professor Picone, the United Nations meets both these requirements
and can thus act at the same time as a traditional international organization, entrusted by its
members to pursue the purposes deﬁned in its Charter and within the limits contained therein, and
as a material organ of the international community for the protection of erga omnes obligations
according to customary international law. The exercise of new powers by the Security Council,
such as the creation of international criminal tribunals,2 the establishment of peacekeeping
operations of the ‘second’ and ‘third’ generation, nation-building, international administration of
territories and the authorization to use force by States and regional organizations outside any
control or direction by the Council itself, must all be seen as manifestations of the latter
phenomenon. The Security Council has in particular been employed by States acting uti universi
well beyond the conditions set up in Chapter VII, in order to endorse interventions that they had
already intended to carry out unilaterally for the protection of erga omnes obligations. Such use of
the UN is envisaged, according to Professor Picone, in an emerging norm of customary inter-
national law (p 332).
The author presents an admirable analysis of cases of use of force by States with or without the
Security Council’s authorization. In his view, Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter applies exclusively
to the use of force by States in their reciprocal (‘bilateral’) relations and does not prohibit the use
of force as a countermeasure in response to the violation of erga omnes obligations, as those
obligations were unknown at the time the Charter was drafted: such countermeasures are thus still
regulated by customary international law. Therefore, the legality of the unilateral interventions
carried out by States for the enforcement of erga omnes obligations since the early 1990s must be
assessed in the light of customary international law, and not of the Charter, with the consequence
that it is irrelevant whether or not those interventions were authorized by the Security Council or
whether or not a subsequent resolution was adopted to expressly or implicitly approve them.
Hence, the 1999 Nato Operation ‘Allied Force’ against Yugoslavia was (at least initially) lawful
as it was aimed at enforcing the erga omnes obligation to prevent serious violations of human
rights (even though it eventually became unlawful because of NATO’s conduct during the
hostilities), while the 2003 Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ was not motivated by any violation of erga
omnes obligations and was thus inconsistent with customary international law.3 The references
made by the United States and the United Kingdom to certain Security Council resolutions was
nothing but the (attempted) misuse of multilateral institutions to implement unilateral policies,
without this having any effect on the legality of the intervention.
2 The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is thus seen by the author as a
sanction adopted by the Security Council to react against the violations of erga omnes obligations committed by
the belligerents in Yugoslavia (p 358).
3 According to Professor Picone, disarmament is not an erga omnes obligation and the links between Iraq and
international terrorism were not sufﬁciently established (pp 490–97). What the author seems to imply is that, for
customary international law to justify a forcible reaction, the serious violation of erga omnes obligations must
be occurring at the time the intervention takes place, as it is well-known that the Saddam Hussein regime had
committed serious violations in the past, for instance against Kurds and Shiites.
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The non-application of Article 2 (4) to countermeasures adopted by States in response to the
violation of erga omnes obligations (or, to put it differently, to the commission of international
crimes) is conﬁrmed, according to the author, by the fact that Article 51 autonomously and
expressly regulates the reaction to the only international crime known when the Charter was
drafted (pp 417–19).4 In Professor Picone’s view, the Article 51 model, providing for the primacy
of the United Nations in the repression of an international crime and for the unilateral use of force
by the victim and also by third States only when the organization is unable to adopt the necessary
measures, should be applied to the enforcement of all erga omnes obligations.
The book ideally ends where it started, ie with a critical discussion of the International Law
Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility. The author regrets the fact that, in the version
ﬁnally adopted in 2001, the Commission exclusively focused on the relationship between re-
ciprocal rights and obligations and neglected functional powers exercised by States on behalf of
the international community (p 608). The ILC Articles have also left unsolved the issue of the link
between international crimes and the competences of the United Nations. Professor Picone doubts
that the solutions expressly proposed by the Commission are effective: at the end of the day, the
most important provision is the saving clause contained in Article 41 (3), which reafﬁrms the role
played by customary international law in regulating the consequences of a serious violation of a
peremptory norm and which also necessarily affects the scope of Articles 48 (2) and 54 (pp 636–
38). The speciﬁc customary regimes allowing all States to use armed force to enforce certain erga
omnes obligations are thus preserved and the idea of ‘international crimes’, ie breaches of inter-
national law involving more serious consequences than ‘ordinary’ violations, still permeates the
ILC Articles (p 643).
The book usefully reproduces as an appendix the text of the ILC Articles on State
Responsibility in their 1996 and 2001 versions. Readers would have probably also beneﬁted from
an index, especially considering that, because of its being a collection of essays, some concepts
are discussed several times throughout the book. However, the book is far from being repetitive.
With its stimulating and challenging pages, often in contrast with the predominant views, it is easy
to predict that it will become the livre de chevet of all those interested not only in the problem of
erga omnes obligations, but also in the broader question of the future developments of the inter-
national legal order.
MARCO ROSCINI*
Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights Under International Law: From Victims to Actors by JERE´MIE
GILBERT [Transnational Publishers Inc, Ardsley, New York, 2006, 349 pp, ISBN 1-57105-369-7,
$115.00 (h/bk)]
Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights Under International Law: From Victims to Actors is a welcome
addition to the ever-growing literature on indigenous peoples’ rights under international law.
Gilbert admirably achieves his main goal ‘to provide a comprehensive understanding of the
international law approach to indigenous peoples’ land rights’ (xiii). Gilbert’s passion for his
subject is palpable and illuminates every page, as do his zeal to expose international law’s com-
plicity in indigenous peoples’ loss of their territories and tentative hope that international law
might now provide some protection of indigenous peoples’ lands. The choice of topic is also to be
4 In Professor Picone’s opinion, if Art 2 (4) does not apply to violations of erga omnes obligations, then Art
51 is not an exception to the prohibition of the use of force contained in that provision, but rather an autonomous
regulation of the reaction to the crime of aggression in order to protect the related erga omnes obligation
(p 256).
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